On the Weights of Sovereign Nations

38 Pages Posted: 7 Nov 2017 Last revised: 23 Sep 2018

See all articles by Antonin Macé

Antonin Macé

Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS

Rafael Treibich

University of Southern Denmark - Department of Business and Economics

Date Written: September 12, 2018

Abstract

We study the design of voting rules for committees representing heterogeneous groups (countries, states, districts) when cooperation among groups is voluntary. While efficiency recommends weighting groups proportionally to their stakes, we show that accounting for participation constraints entails overweighting some groups, those for which the incentive to cooperate is the lowest. When collective decisions are not enforceable, cooperation induces more stringent constraints that may require granting veto power to certain groups. In the benchmark case where groups differ only in their population size (i.e, the apportionment problem), the model provides a rationale for setting a minimum representation for smaller groups.

Keywords: International Unions, Constitutional Design, Veto, Participation Constraints

JEL Classification: F53, D02, C61, C73

Suggested Citation

Macé, Antonin and Treibich, Rafael, On the Weights of Sovereign Nations (September 12, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3065877 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3065877

Antonin Macé (Contact Author)

Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS ( email )

France

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/antoninmace/home

Rafael Treibich

University of Southern Denmark - Department of Business and Economics ( email )

DK-5230 Odense
Denmark

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