Stressed Banks

59 Pages Posted: 8 Nov 2017 Last revised: 2 Nov 2020

See all articles by Diane Pierret

Diane Pierret

Universite du Luxembourg - Luxembourg School of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Roberto Steri

University of Luxembourg

Date Written: October 11, 2020


We investigate the risk-taking of stressed banks, that is the large financial institutions that have faced unprecedented regulatory supervision and capitalization requirements. We take steps toward identifying how supervision affects risk-taking in the banking system. In the Dodd-Frank Act, supervision distinctly improves borrowers' ratings by 0.7 rating classes. Banks respond to supervision heterogeneously, depending on the capital charges associated with their investments. Ignoring the confounding effect of capital requirements leads to the erroneous conclusion that supervision under the Dodd-Frank Act is ineffective. Our results indicate that stressed banks improve financial stability because they are better capitalized and engage in safer lending.

Keywords: Financial Stability, Supervision, Capital Regulation, Dodd-Frank Act, Bank Profitability

JEL Classification: G01, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Pierret, Diane and Steri, Roberto, Stressed Banks (October 11, 2020). Available at SSRN: or

Diane Pierret (Contact Author)

Universite du Luxembourg - Luxembourg School of Finance ( email )

162a, avenue de la Faïencerie
Luxembourg-Limpertsberg, L-1511

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

United Kingdom

Roberto Steri

University of Luxembourg ( email )

Kirchberg, 6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi

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