Re-Electing Politicians and Policy Outcomes Under No Term Limits: Evidence from Peruvian Municipalities
33 Pages Posted: 8 Nov 2017 Last revised: 11 Feb 2018
Date Written: February 10, 2018
This paper examines whether, in the absence of term limits, re-elected politicians perform differently than their newly elected peers. Using a sharp regression discontinuity design and data from Peruvian municipalities, we find that having a re-elected mayor has few meaningful effects on local policy outcomes. The potential gains from re-electing politicians appear to be offset by rapid learning-by-doing and diminishing electoral incentives. Re-elected mayors exhibit better performance only early in the electoral cycle, and are less likely to run for and win an additional term. Overall, the results cast doubts on the advantages of re-electing experienced politicians.
Keywords: Re-Elected Politicians, Local Governance, Term Limits
JEL Classification: D72, H70, O12
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation