Re-Electing Politicians and Policy Outcomes Under No Term Limits: Evidence from Peruvian Municipalities

33 Pages Posted: 8 Nov 2017 Last revised: 11 Feb 2018

See all articles by Fernando M. Aragon

Fernando M. Aragon

Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Department of Economics

Ricardo Pique

Ryerson University, Faculty of Arts - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 10, 2018

Abstract

This paper examines whether, in the absence of term limits, re-elected politicians perform differently than their newly elected peers. Using a sharp regression discontinuity design and data from Peruvian municipalities, we find that having a re-elected mayor has few meaningful effects on local policy outcomes. The potential gains from re-electing politicians appear to be offset by rapid learning-by-doing and diminishing electoral incentives. Re-elected mayors exhibit better performance only early in the electoral cycle, and are less likely to run for and win an additional term. Overall, the results cast doubts on the advantages of re-electing experienced politicians.

Keywords: Re-Elected Politicians, Local Governance, Term Limits

JEL Classification: D72, H70, O12

Suggested Citation

Aragon, Fernando M. and Pique Cebrecos, Ricardo Santiago, Re-Electing Politicians and Policy Outcomes Under No Term Limits: Evidence from Peruvian Municipalities (February 10, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3066426 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3066426

Fernando M. Aragon

Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Department of Economics ( email )

8888 University Drive
Burnaby, British Columbia V5A 1S6
Canada

Ricardo Santiago Pique Cebrecos (Contact Author)

Ryerson University, Faculty of Arts - Department of Economics ( email )

Canada

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/piquericardo/

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