Insuring Your Donation: An Experiment

28 Pages Posted: 8 Nov 2017

See all articles by Renate Buijze

Renate Buijze

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), Erasmus School of Law, Students

Christoph Engel

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics, Students; Universität Osnabrück - Faculty of Law

Sigrid Hemels

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law; Lund University School of Economics and Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2017

Abstract

An increasing fraction of donations is channeled through donation intermediaries. These entities serve multiple purposes, one of which seems to be providing donors with greater certainty: that the donation reaches its intended goal, and that the donor may be sure to receive a tax benefit. We interpret this function as insurance and test the option to insure donations in the lab. Our participants indeed have a positive willingness to pay for insurance against either contingency. Yet the insurance option is only critical for their willingness to donate to a charity if the risk affects the proper use of their donation. Participants have a higher willingness to pay for insurance if, in case the risk materializes, they receive their money back. With this design of the insurance, almost no participant wants to donate if she is not insured.

Suggested Citation

Buijze, Renate and Engel, Christoph and Hemels, Sigrid, Insuring Your Donation: An Experiment (December 2017). Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Vol. 14, Issue 4, pp. 858-885, 2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067106 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jels.12166

Renate Buijze (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), Erasmus School of Law, Students ( email )

Netherlands

Christoph Engel

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany
+049 228 914160 (Phone)
+049 228 9141655 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.coll.mpg.de/engel.html

University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics

Postfach 2220
D-53012 Bonn
Germany

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics, Students ( email )

Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
PO Box 1738
Rotterdam
Netherlands

Universität Osnabrück - Faculty of Law

Osnabruck, D-49069
Germany

Sigrid Hemels

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law ( email )

3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.esl.eur.nl/profile/profiel_metis/1112068

Lund University School of Economics and Management ( email )

Lund

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