Explaining G20 and BRICS Compliance
Accountability for Effectiveness in Global Governance, Forthcoming
Posted: 10 Nov 2017 Last revised: 9 Dec 2017
Date Written: December 4, 2017
In Chapter 11, “Explaining G20 and BRICS compliance,” Marina Larionova, Mark Rakhmangulov and Andrey Shelepov explore the internal and external factors influencing G20 and BRICS compliance. They examine, in turn, the G20 and BRICS’ commitments, their compliance and the distribution of commitments and compliance across issue areas, covering the G20 from 2008 to 2014 and the BRICS from 2011 to 2015. As internal causes of compliance, they examine and compare the trends in the compliance catalysts of priority placement, numerical targets, time lines, self-accountability pledges and mandates to implement and/or monitor the commitments’ implementation. As external causes, they focus on the demand for collective actions and the club members’ collective power to respond and deliver on the pledges made. They then explore if self-accountability measures built by the institutions in response to the demand for effectiveness and legitimacy facilitate compliance. They next highlight the catalysts, causes of compliance and their combinations with the greatest power to incentivize implementation. They conclude that a shared sense of urgency for collective actions and a systemic self-accountability measure incentivize implementation, with the catalyst of a self-accountability measure raising compliance and the catalyst of a numerical target lowering it.
Keywords: Global governance, G20, BRICS
JEL Classification: F5
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation