Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?

41 Pages Posted: 9 Apr 2002

See all articles by Viral V. Acharya

Viral V. Acharya

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2002

Abstract

The merit of having international convergence of bank capital requirements in the presence of divergent closure policies of different central banks is examined. While the privately optimal level of bank capital decreases with regulatory forbearance (they are strategic substitutes), the socially optimal level of bank capital increases with regulatory forbearance (they are strategic complements). Hence, in optimal regulatory design, the level of minimum bank capital requirement increases with the forbearance in central bank closure policy. The lack of such linkage leads to a spillover from more forbearing to less forbearing economies and reduces the competitive advantage of banks in less forbearing economies. Linking the central bank's forbearance to its alignment with domestic bankowners, it is shown that in equilibrium a regression towards the worst closure policy may result: the central banks of initially less forbearing economies have to adopt greater forbearance as well.

Keywords: Bank regulation, capital adequacy, closure policy, risk-shifting, financial integration, international spillovers

JEL Classification: D62, E58, G21, G28, G38

Suggested Citation

Acharya, Viral V., Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable? (March 2002). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3253. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=306769

Viral V. Acharya (Contact Author)

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

HOME PAGE: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sternfin/vacharya/public_html/~vacharya.htm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance

Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States

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