Constrained Listening, Audience Alignment, and Expert Communication

50 Pages Posted: 13 Nov 2017

See all articles by Kevin Smith

Kevin Smith

Stanford University Graduate School of Business

Mirko Stanislav Heinle

University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department

Paul E. Fischer

University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department

Date Written: November 9, 2017

Abstract

We consider a cheap talk setting with two senders and a continuum of receivers with heterogenous preferences. Receivers listen to just one sender, but can choose which sender to listen to. We determine that: (i) full communication is possible for a large set of sender preferences; (ii) both senders attract listeners only if they are oppositional and not too polarized; and (iii) senders with preferences that are closer to the average receiver preference are listened to by a greater proportion of receivers. In extensions, we endogenize the senders’ preferences and investigate the effects of an entertainment benefit derived by receivers.

Keywords: Cheap talk, communication, media bias

JEL Classification: D83, D72, C72

Suggested Citation

Smith, Kevin and Heinle, Mirko Stanislav and Fischer, Paul E., Constrained Listening, Audience Alignment, and Expert Communication (November 9, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3068376 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3068376

Kevin Smith (Contact Author)

Stanford University Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

Mirko Stanislav Heinle

University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

Paul E. Fischer

University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

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