Credit Misallocation During the European Financial Crisis

68 Pages Posted: 10 Nov 2017

See all articles by Fabiano Schivardi

Fabiano Schivardi

Luiss Guido Carli - Department of Economics and Finance; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Enrico Settee

Bank of Italy - International Relations Department

Guido Tabellini

Bocconi University - Department of Economics; Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research; Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo)

Multiple version iconThere are 6 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2017

Abstract

Do banks with low capital extend excessive credit to weak firms, and does this matter for aggregate efficiency? Using a unique dataset that covers almost all bank-firm relationships in Italy in the period 2004-2013, we find that during the Eurozone financial crisis (i) undercapitalized banks were less likely to cut credit to non-viable firms; (ii) credit misallocation increased the failure rate of healthy firms and reduced the failure rate of non-viable firms and (iii) nevertheless, the adverse effects of credit misallocation on the growth rate of healthier firms were negligible, as were the effects on TFP dispersion. This goes against previous influential findings, which, we argue, face serious identification problems. Thus, while banks with low capital can be an important source of aggregate inefficiency in the long run, their contribution to the severity of the great recession via capital misallocation was modest.

Keywords: bank capitalization, zombie lending, capital misallocation

JEL Classification: D23, E24, G21

Suggested Citation

Schivardi, Fabiano and Settee, Enrico and Tabellini, Guido, Credit Misallocation During the European Financial Crisis (November 2017). BIS Working Paper No. 669, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3068486

Fabiano Schivardi (Contact Author)

Luiss Guido Carli - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Viale Romania 32
Rome, Rome 00187
Italy

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Enrico Settee

Bank of Italy - International Relations Department

Via Milano, 64
00184 Rome
Italy

Guido Tabellini

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

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