Regulation, Minimum Wage and Informality: Introduction to Symposium

4 Pages Posted: 13 Nov 2017

See all articles by Kaushik Basu

Kaushik Basu

Cornell University - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Brookings Institution

Stefan Dercon

University of Oxford - Department of Economics

Ravi Kanbur

Cornell University; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Jan Svejnar

School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, NY, USA; CEPR; IZA; CERGE-EI; University of Ljubljana

Date Written: November 2017

Abstract

Are markets in developing and transition economies over‐regulated or under‐regulated? This is a perennial question in the development discourse, but one for which answers appear to come more from preset ideology than from context‐specific analysis and evidence. These issues become even more pressing when the debate turns to the links between regulation, deregulation and inequality. The recent experience of rising inequality in many countries has also brought to the fore predictable policy positions. A key aspect of labor regulation in developing countries, and one becoming more prominent in the era of rising inequality, is the minimum wage. The range of issues around regulation, minimum wage and informality was addressed by papers presented to a conference held in New Delhi on December 17–18, 2014. The conference was co‐sponsored by the World Bank, UK Department for International Development, Cornell University and Columbia University. The organizers of the conference were Kaushik Basu, Stefan Dercon, Ravi Kanbur and Jan Svejnar. A selection of papers from the conference which passed the usual review procedures of the Review of Development Economics, and a further selection of papers from those submitted to the journal, form this symposium.

Suggested Citation

Basu, Kaushik and Dercon, Stefan and Kanbur, Ravi and Svejnar, Jan, Regulation, Minimum Wage and Informality: Introduction to Symposium (November 2017). Review of Development Economics, Vol. 21, Issue 4, pp. 935-938, 2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3069213 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rode.12341

Kaushik Basu (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Ithaca, NY 14853-7601
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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Brookings Institution ( email )

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Stefan Dercon

University of Oxford - Department of Economics ( email )

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Ravi Kanbur

Cornell University ( email )

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United States
607-255-7966 (Phone)
607-255-9984 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.kanbur.dyson.cornell.edu

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Jan Svejnar

School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, NY, USA ( email )

420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

CEPR

London
United Kingdom

IZA

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CERGE-EI

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111 21 Prague 1, Prague
Czech Republic

HOME PAGE: http://www.cerge-ei.cz

University of Ljubljana ( email )

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Ljubljana, 1000
Slovenia

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