The Market for Used Cars: New Evidence of the Lemons Phenomenon

University of Bern, Department of Economics Discussion Paper 02.02

35 Pages Posted: 29 Apr 2002 Last revised: 18 Jul 2008

See all articles by Winand Emons

Winand Emons

University of Bern - Institute of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

George Sheldon

University of Basel - Department of Applied Economic Research

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 14, 2007

Abstract

The lemons model assumes that owners of used cars have an informational advantage over potential buyers with respect to the quality of their vehicles. Owners of bad cars will try to sell them to unsuspecting buyers while owners of good cars will hold on to theirs. Consequently, the quality of traded automobiles should be sub-average. In contrast to previous work, the following paper tests both the assumption of informa-tional asymmetry and the prediction of sub-average traded car quality using a sample consisting of all 1985 cars registered in the Swiss canton of Basle-City over the period 1985-1991. Our data support both the assumption and the prediction of the lemons model. The lemons problem does not appear to be widespread, however.

Keywords: adverse selection, used car market, duration models

JEL Classification: C41, D82, L15, L62

Suggested Citation

Emons, Winand and Sheldon, George, The Market for Used Cars: New Evidence of the Lemons Phenomenon (June 14, 2007). University of Bern, Department of Economics Discussion Paper 02.02, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=306939 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.306939

Winand Emons (Contact Author)

University of Bern - Institute of Economics ( email )

Schanzeneckstrasse 1
Postfach 8573
CH-3001 Bern
Switzerland
+41 31 721 76 47 (Phone)
+41 31 684 3783 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://winand-emons.ch/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

George Sheldon

University of Basel - Department of Applied Economic Research ( email )

Petersgraben 51
Basel, CH-4003
Switzerland
+41 61 267 33 76 (Phone)
+41 61 267 12 36 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
512
Abstract Views
4,169
Rank
102,806
PlumX Metrics