Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters

48 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2017

See all articles by Filip Matějka

Filip Matějka

Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute)

Guido Tabellini

Bocconi University - Department of Economics; Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research; Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo)

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 1, 2017

Abstract

This paper studies how voters' selective ignorance interacts with policy design by political candidates. It shows that the selectivity empowers voters with extreme preferences and small groups, divisive issues attract most attention and public goods are underfunded. Finer granularity of information increases these inefficiencies. Rational inattention can also explain why competing candidates do not always converge on the same policy issues, and how the poor are politically empowered by welfare programs.

Suggested Citation

Matějka, Filip and Tabellini, Guido, Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters (September 1, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3070204 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3070204

Filip Matějka

Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute) ( email )

P.O. Box 882
7 Politickych veznu
Prague 1, 111 21
Czech Republic

HOME PAGE: http://www.cerge-ei.cz

Guido Tabellini (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
251
Abstract Views
1,083
rank
111,492
PlumX Metrics