Hedge Fund Activism and Internal Capital Markets

60 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2017 Last revised: 1 Oct 2018

See all articles by Sehoon Kim

Sehoon Kim

University of Florida - Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate

Date Written: March 20, 2018

Abstract

Hedge fund activism improves the internal capital allocation efficiency of multi-division firms. Targeted conglomerates increase segment investment while reducing each division's reliance on its own cash flow, primarily for divisions with the best investment opportunities within the firm. Consequently, the sensitivity of a division's investment to its own cash flow becomes similar to its sensitivity to cash flows from other divisions. Such changes are stronger when the firm is ex-ante financially constrained, and when the CEO is replaced or payout is increased soon after being targeted. These effects persist in the long-run and are accompanied by diminished diversification discounts.

Keywords: Hedge Fund, Hedge Fund Activism, Shareholder Activism, Corporate Governance, Internal Capital Market, Resource Allocation, Diversification

JEL Classification: G23, G31, G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Kim, Sehoon, Hedge Fund Activism and Internal Capital Markets (March 20, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3070676 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3070676

Sehoon Kim (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate ( email )

P.O. Box 117168
Gainesville, FL 32611
United States

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