Falling Short of Constitutional Norms: Does ‘Normative (In)congruence’ Explain the Courts’ Inability to Promote the Right to Water in South Africa?

43 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2017

See all articles by Richard Stacey

Richard Stacey

University of Toronto, Faculty of Law

Date Written: December 27, 2016

Abstract

In South Africa, municipal non-compliance with legislation promoting the constitutional right to sufficient water is both a failure of the rule of law and a betrayal of that right. Judicial intervention has prompted formalistic compliance with water law, but the underlying commitment to sufficient water remains unfulfilled. Does the inability of courts to achieve social justice despite enforcing social legislation confirm the thesis that commitments to the rule of law and to social justice are inconsistent, that upholding the rule of law may not advance social justice? This article offers an alternative to this “inconsistency thesis”, arguing that the rule of law can accommodate social justice if it demands “normative congruence” alongside congruence with formal rules. Empirical investigation reveals that structural challenges and the multifarious normative demands on officials create a condition of “normative incongruence” that impedes the pursuit of social justice, even as courts compel congruence with formal rules.

Keywords: Rule of Law, Social and Economic Rights, Right to Water, Administrative Law, Administrative State, Constitutional Law

JEL Classification: K32, K23, K42, K30

Suggested Citation

Stacey, Richard, Falling Short of Constitutional Norms: Does ‘Normative (In)congruence’ Explain the Courts’ Inability to Promote the Right to Water in South Africa? (December 27, 2016). Law and Social Inquiry, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3070999

Richard Stacey (Contact Author)

University of Toronto, Faculty of Law ( email )

78 and 84 Queen's Park
Toronto, Ontario M5S 2C5
Canada

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
85
Abstract Views
564
Rank
592,276
PlumX Metrics