Firm-Level Political Risk: Measurement and Effects

81 Pages Posted: 17 Nov 2017

See all articles by Tarek A. Hassan

Tarek A. Hassan

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Stephan Hollander

Tilburg University - Tilburg School of Economics and Management

Ahmed Tahoun

London Business School

Laurence van Lent

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH - Accounting Department

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2017

Abstract

We adapt simple tools from computational linguistics to construct a new measure of political risk faced by individual US firms: the share of their quarterly earnings conference calls that they devote to political risks. We validate our measure by showing that it correctly identifies calls containing extensive conversations on risks that are political in nature, that it varies intuitively over time and across sectors, and that it correlates with the firm's actions and stock market volatility in a manner that is highly indicative of political risk. Firms exposed to political risk retrench hiring and investment and actively lobby and donate to politicians. Interestingly, we find that the incidence of political risk across firms is far more heterogeneous and volatile than previously thought. The vast majority of the variation in our measure is at the firm-level rather than at the aggregate or sector-level, in the sense that it is neither captured by time fixed effects and the interaction of sector and time fixed effects, nor by heterogeneous exposure of individual firms to aggregate political risk. The dispersion of this firm-level political risk increases significantly at times with high aggregate political risk. Decomposing our measure of political risk by topic, we find that firms that devote more time to discussing risks associated with a given political topic tend to increase lobbying on that topic, but not on other topics, in the following quarter.

Keywords: firm-level, Lobbying, Political uncertainty, quantification

JEL Classification: D80, E22, G18, G38, H32

Suggested Citation

Hassan, Tarek Alexander and Hollander, Stephan and Tahoun, Ahmed and van Lent, Laurence, Firm-Level Political Risk: Measurement and Effects (November 2017). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12436. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071068

Tarek Alexander Hassan (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/tarek.hassan/index.html

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Stephan Hollander

Tilburg University - Tilburg School of Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 8288 (Phone)
+31 13 466 8001 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.uvt.nl/people/s.hollander

Ahmed Tahoun

London Business School ( email )

Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London, London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom

Laurence Van Lent

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH - Accounting Department ( email )

Adickesallee 32-34
Frankfurt, 60322
Germany
+4969154008531 (Phone)

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