Gender Preference Gaps and Voting for Redistribution

University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 271, Revised version

56 Pages Posted: 17 Nov 2017 Last revised: 18 Jan 2022

See all articles by Eva Ranehill

Eva Ranehill

University of Gothenburg - Department of Economics

Roberto A. Weber

University of Zurich - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: December 6, 2021

Abstract

There is substantial evidence that women tend to support different policies and political candidates than men. Many studies also document gender differences in a variety of important preference dimensions, such as risk-taking, competition and pro-sociality. However, the degree to which differential voting by men and women is related to these gaps in more basic preferences requires an improved understanding. We conduct an experiment in which individuals in small laboratory “societies” repeatedly vote for redistribution policies and engage in production. We find that women vote for more egalitarian redistribution and that this difference persists with experience and in environments with varying degrees of risk. This gender voting gap is accounted for partly by both gender gaps in preferences and by expectations regarding economic circumstances. However, including both these controls in a regression analysis indicates that the latter is the primary driving force. We also observe policy differences between male- and female-controlled groups, though these are substantially smaller than the mean individual differences - a natural consequence of the aggregation of individual preferences into collective outcomes.

Keywords: gender differences, risk, altruism, redistributive preferences, experiment

JEL Classification: C91, C92, J16, H23

Suggested Citation

Ranehill, Eva and Weber, Roberto A., Gender Preference Gaps and Voting for Redistribution (December 6, 2021). University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 271, Revised version, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071682 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3071682

Eva Ranehill (Contact Author)

University of Gothenburg - Department of Economics ( email )

Vasagatan 1
Gothenburg, 41124
Sweden

Roberto A. Weber

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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