Need vs. Merit: The Large Core of College Admissions Markets

52 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2017 Last revised: 13 Jul 2018

See all articles by Avinatan Hassidim

Avinatan Hassidim

Bar Ilan university, Israel

Assaf Romm

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics; Stanford University

Ran I. Shorrer

Pennsylvania State University

Date Written: June 28, 2018

Abstract

We study college admissions markets, where colleges offer multiple funding levels. Colleges wish to recruit the best-qualified students subject to budget and capacity constraints. Student-proposing deferred acceptance is stable and strategy-proof for students, but the set of stable allocations is large and the scope for manipulation by colleges is substantial, even in large markets. Under deferred acceptance, truthful colleges allocate funding based on merit. Successful manipulations consider applicants' outside options (specifically need) when allocating funding. In Hungary, where the centralized clearinghouse uses deferred acceptance, choosing another stable allocation would increase the number of admitted students by at least 3%.

Keywords: Matching with contracts, college admissions, core

JEL Classification: C78, D47

Suggested Citation

Hassidim, Avinatan and Romm, Assaf and Shorrer, Ran I., Need vs. Merit: The Large Core of College Admissions Markets (June 28, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071873 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3071873

Avinatan Hassidim

Bar Ilan university, Israel ( email )

Israel

Assaf Romm

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, 91905
Israel

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Ran I. Shorrer (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

University Park
State College, PA 16802
United States

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