Career Risk and Market Discipline in Asset Management
Kelley School of Business Research Paper No. 17-78
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 558/2018
83 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2017 Last revised: 10 Aug 2018
There are 3 versions of this paper
Career Risk and Market Discipline in Asset Management
Career Risk and Market Discipline in Asset Management
Career Risk and Market Discipline in Asset Management
Date Written: August 5, 2018
Abstract
We establish that the labor market helps discipline asset managers via the impact of fund liquidations on their careers. Using hand-collected data on 1,948 professionals, we find that top managers working for funds liquidated after persistently poor relative performance suffer demotion coupled with a significant loss in imputed compensation. Scarring effects are absent when liquidations are preceded by normal relative performance or involve mid-level employees. Seen through the lens of a model with moral hazard and adverse selection, these results can be ascribed to reputation loss rather than bad luck. The findings suggest that performance-induced liquidations supplement compensation-based incentives.
Keywords: Careers, Hedge Funds, Asset Managers, Market Discipline, Scarring Effects
JEL Classification: G20, G23, J24, J62, J63
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Andrew Ellul
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance ( email )
1309 E. 10th St.
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
