The Benefits and Costs of Group Affiliation: Evidence from East Asia

46 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2002

See all articles by Stijn Claessens

Stijn Claessens

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

Joseph P. H. Fan

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - School of Accountancy

Larry H.P. Lang

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 15, 2002

Abstract

This paper investigates the benefits and associated agency costs of using internal capital markets through affiliating with groups using data of two thousand firms from nine East Asian economies between 1994-96. We find that mature and slow-growing firms with ownership structures more likely to create agency problems gain more from group affiliation, while young and high-growth firms more likely lose. Agency problems are important explanatory factors of firm value in economies outside Japan, but less so in Japan. Consistent with the literature, financially-constrained firms benefit from group affiliation. Our results are robust to different time periods and estimation techniques.

Keywords: Business Groups, Agency Problem, Internal Financial Markets, East Asia

JEL Classification: G32, G34, L22, N25

Suggested Citation

Claessens, Stijn and Fan, Po Hung Joseph P. H. and Lang, Hsien Ping Larry, The Benefits and Costs of Group Affiliation: Evidence from East Asia (April 15, 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=307426 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.307426

Stijn Claessens

Bank for International Settlements (BIS) ( email )

Centralbahnplatz 2
CH-4002 Basel
Switzerland

Po Hung Joseph P. H. Fan (Contact Author)

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - School of Accountancy ( email )

Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong
(852) 26097839 (Phone)
(852) 26035114 (Fax)

Hsien Ping Larry Lang

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance ( email )

Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong
+85 2 2609 7761 (Phone)
+85 2 2603 6586 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
820
Abstract Views
3,207
rank
27,082
PlumX Metrics