Discriminatory Persuasion

34 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2017 Last revised: 21 Mar 2018

See all articles by Zhaotian Luo

Zhaotian Luo

New York University (NYU), Department of Politics, Students

Date Written: March 11, 2018

Abstract

Whether someone can persuade someone else to do something depends on who knows what? This paper provides a generic approach to persuade a receiver to take an action on which the receiver has private information. The key of this approach lies in exploiting two kinds of errors the receiver may commit: taking an harmful action and failing to take a beneficial action. The best persuasion strategy gives the receiver a choice of having a larger chance to commit either the first or the second kind of error.

Keywords: Persuasion, Private Information, Specificity-Sensitivity Tradeoff

Suggested Citation

Luo, Zhaotian, Discriminatory Persuasion (March 11, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3075042 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3075042

Zhaotian Luo (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU), Department of Politics, Students ( email )

New York, NY
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
96
rank
257,382
Abstract Views
380
PlumX Metrics