How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective

25 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2017 Last revised: 25 Jan 2018

A. Douglas Melamed

Stanford Law School

Carl Shapiro

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

Date Written: January 2018

Abstract

The antitrust laws can play an important role in ensuring that the rules established by standard setting organizations are effective in preventing the owners of standard-essential patents from engaging in patent holdup. We explain here that both standard-setting organizations and their members can violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act if the rules adopted are ineffective in preventing the owners of standard-essential patents from exploiting the monopoly power they gain as a result of the standard.

Suggested Citation

Melamed, A. Douglas and Shapiro, Carl, How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective (January 2018). Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 510. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3075970 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3075970

Doug Melamed

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

Carl Shapiro (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-5905 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu

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