How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective
25 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2017 Last revised: 25 Jan 2018
Date Written: January 2018
Abstract
The antitrust laws can play an important role in ensuring that the rules established by standard setting organizations are effective in preventing the owners of standard-essential patents from engaging in patent holdup. We explain here that both standard-setting organizations and their members can violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act if the rules adopted are ineffective in preventing the owners of standard-essential patents from exploiting the monopoly power they gain as a result of the standard.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Melamed, Doug and Shapiro, Carl, How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective (January 2018). Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 510, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3075970 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3075970
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