Pushing Shadow Banking into the Light: Reforming the U.S. Tri‐Party Repo Market

Research Handbook in Shadow Banking (2018 Forthcoming)

Widener Law Commonwealth Research Paper No. 17-14

26 Pages Posted: 26 Nov 2017 Last revised: 26 May 2021

See all articles by Christian A. Johnson

Christian A. Johnson

Widener University - Commonwealth Law School

Date Written: November 22, 2017

Abstract

The U.S. tri‐party repo market is one of the most active and liquid in global capital markets. Even more specialized than traditional repo, tri‐party repo has often operated in the shadows of global finance. The U.S. Federal Reserve, however, has helped make this market more transparent and less volatile than it has operated in the past. The U.S. tri-party market has approximately US$1.6 trillion outstanding of repos executed between large financial institutions. It became apparent, however, that the repo market had huge systemic risks due to the domination of two large custodians in the market. This domination resulted in huge amounts of inter-market interdependence. Recognizing the need for systemic changes, the U.S. Federal Reserve as a prudential regulator exercised enormous amounts of pressure on these institutions to reform the market. This reform process could also help serve as an important model for future reforms to other areas of shadow banking.

Keywords: Repo, repurchase agreement, tri-party repo, triparty repo, shadow banking

JEL Classification: K00, K19, K22, K39

Suggested Citation

Johnson, Christian A., Pushing Shadow Banking into the Light: Reforming the U.S. Tri‐Party Repo Market (November 22, 2017). Research Handbook in Shadow Banking (2018 Forthcoming), Widener Law Commonwealth Research Paper No. 17-14, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3076091 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3076091

Christian A. Johnson (Contact Author)

Widener University - Commonwealth Law School ( email )

3800 Vartan Way
Harrisburg, PA 17110-9380
United States

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