Unilateral or Reciprocal Climate Policy? Experimental Evidence from China

Politics and Governance 4/3: 152-171, DOI: 10.17645/pag.v4i3.650

Posted: 28 Nov 2017 Last revised: 12 Dec 2017

Date Written: September 8, 2016


The traditional political economy account of global climate change governance directs our attention to fundamental collective action problems associated with global public goods provision, resulting from positive or negative externalities as well as freeriding. The governance architecture of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol uses the traditional approaches of international diplomacy for addressing such challenges: legally binding commitments based on principles of reciprocity and (fair) cost/burden sharing via formalized carbon-budgeting. Yet, the 2015 Paris Agreement has essentially abandoned this approach, as it now operates on the basis of internationally coordinated and monitored unilateralism. On the presumption that public opinion matters for government policy, we examine how citizens view this shift in climate policy from reciprocity to unilateralism, after many years of exposure to strong reciprocity rhetoric by governments and stakeholders. To that end, we fielded a survey experiment in China, the world’s largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter. The results show that there is, perhaps surprisingly, strong and robust public support for unilateral, non-reciprocal climate policy. To the extent China is interested in pushing ahead with ambitious and thus costly GHG reduction policies, our results suggest that China can leverage segments of public support in order to overcome domestic obstacles to GHG mitigation policies.

Keywords: China; climate policy; reciprocity; unilateralism

Suggested Citation

Bernauer, Thomas and Dong, Liang and McGrath, Liam and Shaymerdenova, Irina and Zhang, Haibin, Unilateral or Reciprocal Climate Policy? Experimental Evidence from China (September 8, 2016). Politics and Governance 4/3: 152-171, DOI: 10.17645/pag.v4i3.650. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3076540

Thomas Bernauer (Contact Author)

ETH Zurich ( email )

Center for Comparative and International Studies
Building IFW, office 45.1, Haldeneggsteig 4
Zurich 8092, 8092
+41 44 632 6466 (Phone)
+41 44 632 1289 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ib.ethz.ch

Liang Dong

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

Liam McGrath

University of Essex ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester, CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

Irina Shaymerdenova

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

Haibin Zhang

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

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