Examining Regulatory Capture: Evidence from the NHL

9 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2017

See all articles by Gregory J. DeAngelo

Gregory J. DeAngelo

Claremont Colleges - Claremont Graduate University

Adam Nowak

West Virginia University

Imke Reimers

Northeastern University - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 2018

Abstract

Regulatory capture has garnered significant attention, but poses a difficult empirical exercise since most relationships between regulators and regulated parties occur behind closed doors. In this research, we overcome this problem by analyzing an environment where the behavior of both the regulator and regulated parties are publicly available. Specifically, we utilize data from the National Hockey League (NHL) to examine the impact of general experience as a referee as well as experience refereeing a particular team on the assignation of penalties. We find that gaining general experience as a referee significantly reduces the number of penalties that a referee assigns. However, as a referee gains experience refereeing a specific team, they significantly reduce the number of penalties assessed to this team relative to teams that they have less experience refereeing, confirming that regulatory capture is observed among referees and teams in the NHL.

JEL Classification: G18, L51, K42

Suggested Citation

DeAngelo, Gregory Joseph and Nowak, Adam and Reimers, Imke, Examining Regulatory Capture: Evidence from the NHL (January 2018). Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 36, Issue 1, pp. 183-191, 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3076632 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/coep.12240

Gregory Joseph DeAngelo (Contact Author)

Claremont Colleges - Claremont Graduate University ( email )

150 E. Tenth Street
Claremont, CA 91711
United States

Adam Nowak

West Virginia University ( email )

PO Box 6025
Morgantown, WV 26506
United States

Imke Reimers

Northeastern University - Department of Economics ( email )

301 Lake Hall
Boston, MA 02115
United States

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