Welfare Theorems for Random Assignments with Priorities

24 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2017 Last revised: 16 Aug 2019

See all articles by Jan Christoph Schlegel

Jan Christoph Schlegel

City, University of London

Akaki Mamageishvili

ETH Zürich - CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich

Date Written: November 25, 2017

Abstract

We provide priority-constrained versions of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem for school choice lotteries. Moreover, we show that a constrained version of a cardinal second welfare theorem fails to hold, but can be restored for a relaxed notion of equilibrium with priority-specific prices.

Keywords: Matching; Random Assignments; Priority-based Allocation; Constrained Efficiency; Pseudo-Market; Welfare Theorem

JEL Classification: C78; D47

Suggested Citation

Schlegel, Jan Christoph and Mamageishvili, Akaki, Welfare Theorems for Random Assignments with Priorities (November 25, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3077231 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3077231

Jan Christoph Schlegel (Contact Author)

City, University of London ( email )

Northampton Square
London, EC1V 0HB
United Kingdom

Akaki Mamageishvili

ETH Zürich - CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich ( email )

Zürichbergstrasse 18
Zurich, 8092
Switzerland

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