Download This PaperWelfare Theorems for Random Assignments with Priorities
29 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2017 Last revised: 5 Aug 2020
Date Written: November 25, 2017
Abstract
We provide priority-constrained versions of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem for school choice lotteries. Moreover, we show that a constrained version of a cardinal second welfare theorem fails to hold, but can be restored for a relaxed notion of equilibrium with priority-specific prices.
Keywords: Matching; Random Assignments; Priority-based Allocation; Constrained Efficiency; Pseudo-Market; Welfare Theorem
JEL Classification: C78; D47
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Schlegel, Jan Christoph and Mamageishvili, Akaki, Welfare Theorems for Random Assignments with Priorities (November 25, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3077231 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3077231
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