52 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2017 Last revised: 1 Dec 2018
Date Written: November 13, 2018
I study Bayesian persuasion games with multiple persuaders in which the persuaders are non-competing: all persuaders want the decision maker to take the same action, regardless of the state. In the case of a single persuader, it is known from previous research that the persuader-optimal information design leaves the decision maker with no surplus. In this paper, I show that with two or more non-competing persuaders and independent tests, there are always equilibria in which the decision maker receives surplus. Moreover, if there is exogenous noise then the decision maker receives surplus in every equilibrium, provided the number of persuaders is sufficiently large.
Keywords: Bayesian persuasion, multiple identical persuaders, endogenous information design, imperfect information
JEL Classification: C72, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation