Non-Competing Persuaders

52 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2017 Last revised: 1 Dec 2018

See all articles by Jiemai Wu

Jiemai Wu

The University of Sydney - School of Economics

Date Written: November 13, 2018

Abstract

I study Bayesian persuasion games with multiple persuaders in which the persuaders are non-competing: all persuaders want the decision maker to take the same action, regardless of the state. In the case of a single persuader, it is known from previous research that the persuader-optimal information design leaves the decision maker with no surplus. In this paper, I show that with two or more non-competing persuaders and independent tests, there are always equilibria in which the decision maker receives surplus. Moreover, if there is exogenous noise then the decision maker receives surplus in every equilibrium, provided the number of persuaders is sufficiently large.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion, multiple identical persuaders, endogenous information design, imperfect information

JEL Classification: C72, D83

Suggested Citation

Wu, Jiemai, Non-Competing Persuaders (November 13, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3077451 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3077451

Jiemai Wu (Contact Author)

The University of Sydney - School of Economics ( email )

Rm 370 Merewether (H04)
Sydney, NSW 2006 2008
Australia

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