Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance

88 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2017 Last revised: 29 Apr 2018

Jonathan Newton

Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research

Date Written: April 9, 2018

Abstract

Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces. Paying particular attention to the work of young researchers, this essay surveys the progress made over the last decade towards understanding these phenomena, and discusses open research topics of importance to economics and the broader social sciences.

Keywords: evolution, game theory, agency, assortativity, behavior

JEL Classification: C73

Suggested Citation

Newton, Jonathan, Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance (April 9, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3077467 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3077467

Jonathan Newton (Contact Author)

Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research ( email )

Yoshida-Honmachi
Sakyo-ku
Kyoto 606-8501
JAPAN

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