The Social Preferences of Democratically Elected Decision Makers and the Conflict between Wealth Generation and Distribution

CEGE - Number 327 – November 2017

31 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2017

See all articles by Alexia Gaudeul

Alexia Gaudeul

Georg-August-Universität Göttingen

Claudia Keser

University of Goettingen (Gottingen)

Date Written: November 21, 2017

Abstract

We run a laboratory experiment where some participants are selected to make investment decisions on behalf of others. We test whether a democratic context influences the social preferences of decision makers in terms of efficiency, altruism and concern for inequality. We find that decision makers who are selected democratically are generally more efficiency-oriented, but also more altruistic, than leaders who are selected at random or by ability. Because wealth generation and distribution sometime conflict, efficiency is no higher with democratic leaders, although payoffs are more equal. We interpret our results in terms of a democratic norm that mitigates how elections may otherwise lead to an enhanced feeling of entitlement to one’s role. We exclude a selection effect and discuss the drivers of our results in terms of belief in the legitimacy of the selection procedure and reduced social distance.

Keywords: altruism, democracy, earned role, efficiency, elitism, entitlement effect, inequality, majority-rule, meritocracy, social preferences

JEL Classification: C91, D63, D64

Suggested Citation

Gaudeul, Alexia and Keser, Claudia, The Social Preferences of Democratically Elected Decision Makers and the Conflict between Wealth Generation and Distribution (November 21, 2017). CEGE - Number 327 – November 2017 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3078121 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3078121

Alexia Gaudeul (Contact Author)

Georg-August-Universität Göttingen ( email )

Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3
Goettingen, 37073
Germany
+49 (0) 551 39 7333 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://agaudeul.free.fr

Claudia Keser

University of Goettingen (Gottingen) ( email )

Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3
Göttingen, 37073
Germany

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