European Monetary Union Reform Preferences of French and German Parliamentarians

46 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2017

See all articles by Sebastian Blesse

Sebastian Blesse

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Pierre Boyer

Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Friedrich Heinemann

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research; University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics

Eckhard Janeba

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Anasuya Raj

University of Paris Saclay

Date Written: 2017

Abstract

This study analyzes results from an original survey of members of the French and German parliaments (Assemblée Nationale, Sénat and Bundestag) on economic policies and institutions of the Eurozone. We find that French politicians are significantly more supportive of Eurobonds, a European unemployment insurance scheme, and an active monetary policy by the ECB than German politicians. At the same time, there are significant differences along party lines, which are often quantitatively more important than differences in nationality. Left-leaning members of parliaments are in favor of new policy instruments at the European or Eurozone level, but are skeptical about the fiscal constraints of the Fiscal Compact. There is widespread consensus across parties and countries that more investment at national levels is warranted.

Keywords: EMU reforms, policy preferences, elite survey, members of national parliament, comparative politics

JEL Classification: E60, E62, F15, H60

Suggested Citation

Blesse, Sebastian and Boyer, Pierre C. and Heinemann, Friedrich and Janeba, Eckhard and Raj, Anasuya, European Monetary Union Reform Preferences of French and German Parliamentarians (2017). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 7-059. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3078628 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3078628

Sebastian Blesse

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Pierre C. Boyer

Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau - Department of Economics ( email )

Route de Saclay
Palaiseau, 91120
France

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Friedrich Heinemann (Contact Author)

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.zew.de

University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics ( email )

Grabengasse 14
Heidelberg, D-69117
Germany

Eckhard Janeba

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )

L7, 3-5
D-68131 Mannheim
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Anasuya Raj

University of Paris Saclay ( email )

France

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