European Monetary Union Reform Preferences of French and German Parliamentarians

45 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2017 Last revised: 1 Mar 2019

See all articles by Sebastian Blesse

Sebastian Blesse

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Pierre Boyer

Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Friedrich Heinemann

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research; University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics

Eckhard Janeba

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Anasuya Raj

University of Paris Saclay

Date Written: 2017

Abstract

We analyze data from an author‐conducted survey of members of the French and German parliaments on European Monetary Union reform preferences. We consider three potential drivers of preferences: nationality, ideology, and personal characteristics. For European Monetary Union policies like Eurobonds, the Fiscal Compact and the European Central Bank asset purchase program we find a robust difference between parliamentarians of both countries if they belong to the same party family and controlling for individual characteristics. Based on our estimates, however, we predict agreement between German left‐wingers and French conservatives even for ideological differences that are smaller than the current difference between the left and the right European party families. Our findings suggest that deeply‐rooted national differences do not impose a prohibitive obstacle to a German‐French parliamentary consensus on European Monetary Union policies.

Keywords: Comparative politics, European Monetary Union reforms, elite survey, members of national parliament, policy preferences

JEL Classification: E60, E62, F15, H60

Suggested Citation

Blesse, Sebastian and Boyer, Pierre C. and Heinemann, Friedrich and Janeba, Eckhard and Raj, Anasuya, European Monetary Union Reform Preferences of French and German Parliamentarians (2017). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 17-059. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3078628 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3078628

Sebastian Blesse

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Pierre C. Boyer

Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau - Department of Economics ( email )

Route de Saclay
Palaiseau, 91120
France

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Friedrich Heinemann (Contact Author)

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.zew.de

University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics ( email )

Grabengasse 14
Heidelberg, D-69117
Germany

Eckhard Janeba

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )

L7, 3-5
D-68131 Mannheim
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Anasuya Raj

University of Paris Saclay ( email )

France

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