What Congress's Repeal Efforts Can Teach Us About Regulatory Reform

Administrative Law Review Accord, Vol. 3, P. 43, 2017

U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 17-51

15 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2017 Last revised: 2 Jan 2018

See all articles by Cary Coglianese

Cary Coglianese

University of Pennsylvania Law School

Gabriel Scheffler

University of Pennsylvania

Date Written: December 31, 2017

Abstract

Major legislative actions during the early part of the 115th Congress have undermined the central argument for regulatory reform measures such as the REINS Act, a bill that would require congressional approval of all new major regulations. Proponents of the REINS Act argue that it would make the federal regulatory system more democratic by shifting responsibility for regulatory decisions away from unelected bureaucrats and toward the people’s representatives in Congress. But separate legislative actions in the opening of the 115th Congress only call this argument into question. Congress’s most significant initiatives during this period — its derailed attempts to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act and its successful efforts to repeal fifteen regulations under the Congressional Review Act — exhibited a startling lack of democratic deliberation. These repeal efforts reveal how the REINS Act would counterintuitively undermine key democratic elements of the current regulatory process by rendering it less transparent and deliberative.

Keywords: Administrative law, regulation, rulemaking, oversight, accountability, legislation, delegation, separation of powers, democracy, deliberation, REINS Act, 115th Congress, Affordable Care Act, ACA, repeal and replace, health law, Congressional Review Act

Suggested Citation

Coglianese, Cary and Scheffler, Gabriel, What Congress's Repeal Efforts Can Teach Us About Regulatory Reform (December 31, 2017). Administrative Law Review Accord, Vol. 3, P. 43, 2017; U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 17-51. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3078712

Cary Coglianese (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-6867 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.upenn.edu/coglianese

Gabriel Scheffler

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

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