Providing Global Public Goods: Electoral Delegation and Cooperation

17 Pages Posted: 5 Dec 2017

See all articles by Martin G. Kocher

Martin G. Kocher

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics; Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) - Department of Economics & Finance; Göteborg University - School of Business, Economics and Law; Queensland University of Technology - School of Economics and Finance

Fangfang Tan

Tilburg University - Department of Economics

Jing Yu

Technische Universität München (TUM)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2018

Abstract

This study experimentally examines the effect of electoral delegation on providing global public goods shared by several groups. Each group elects one delegate who can freely decide on each group member's contribution to the global public goods. Our results show that people mostly vote for delegates who assign equal contributions for every group member. However, in contrast to standard theoretical predictions for our delegation mechanism, unequal contributions across groups drive cooperation down over time, and it decreases efficiency by almost 50% compared to the selfish benchmark. This pattern is not driven by delegates trying to exploit their fellow group members, as indicated by theory. It is driven by conditional cooperation of delegates across groups. Since one of the potential sources of the resulting inefficiency is the polycentric nature of global public goods provision together with other‐regarding preferences, we use the term to describe our finding.

JEL Classification: C92, D72, H41

Suggested Citation

Kocher, Martin G. and Tan, Fangfang and Yu, Jing, Providing Global Public Goods: Electoral Delegation and Cooperation (January 2018). Economic Inquiry, Vol. 56, Issue 1, pp. 381-397, 2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3079066 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12482

Martin G. Kocher (Contact Author)

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Ludwigstrasse 28
Munich, D-80539
Germany

Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) - Department of Economics & Finance ( email )

Stumpergasse 56
A-1060 Vienna, A-1060
Austria

Göteborg University - School of Business, Economics and Law ( email )

Vasagatan 1
Goteborg, 40530
Sweden

Queensland University of Technology - School of Economics and Finance ( email )

GPO Box 2434
2 George Street
Brisbane, Queensland 4001
Australia

Fangfang Tan

Tilburg University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC 5000 LE
Netherlands
+49 89 24246 5252 (Phone)
+49 89 24246 5299 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/public_economics/public_economics_people/fangfang_tan.cfm

Jing Yu

Technische Universität München (TUM) ( email )

Arcisstrasse 21
Munich, 80333
Germany

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