Judging International Dispute Settlement: From the Investment Court System to the Aarhus Convention's Compliance Committee
Forthcoming in: Sacha Garben and Inge Govaere (eds), The interface between EU and International Law (Hart Publishing 2018)
29 Pages Posted: 4 Dec 2017
Date Written: December 1, 2017
This working paper explores the legal limits set by the EU Treaties on the EU’s ability to submit itself to international dispute settlement in the context of the Aarhus Convention and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Both the Investment Court System (ICS) under CETA and the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee (ACCC) may be faced with questions of EU law when deciding cases brought to them by individuals. This may raise questions about their compatibility with the EU’s system of judicial dialogue between the courts of the Member States and the European Court of Justice, which ensures the uniform interpretation and application of EU law. In order to determine whether and to what extent this is problematic in the context of the EU’s autonomous legal order, this working paper compares the nature of dispute settlement and the powers of ICS and ACCC in light of the legal limits set by the EU Treaties. As a result of this comparative analysis, the working paper concludes that both the nature of the ACCC as a non-judicial consultative body and its more limited powers pose less of a threat to the autonomy of the EU’s legal order than ICS.
Keywords: Investment Court System, ICS, Aarhus Convention, Aarhus Convention Compliance committee, autonomy of EU law, Opinion 2/13, Opinion 1/17, definitive interpretation of EU law, compatibility, EU constitutional law, EU external relations law
JEL Classification: K32, K33, K4
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation