Earnings Predictability, Information Asymmetry, and Market Liquidity

Posted: 13 May 2002

See all articles by John Affleck-Graves

John Affleck-Graves

University of Notre Dame - Department of Finance

Carolyn M. Callahan

University of Louisville - College of Business

Niranjan Chipalkatti

Ohio Northern University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

We investigate the relation between earnings predictability, information asymmetry and the behavior of the adverse selection cost component of the bid-ask spread around quarterly earnings announcements for NASDAQ firms. While we find an increase in the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread on the day of and the day prior to quarterly earnings announcements for firms with less predictable earnings, we find no evidence of such changes for firms with more predictable earnings. During a non-announcement period, we find that firms with relatively less predictable earnings have consistently higher total bid-ask spreads than firms with more predictable earnings. This finding suggests that firms with relatively less predictable earnings have a higher cost of equity capital than comparable firms with more predictable earning streams, ceteris paribus. Hence, earnings predictability may be a legitimate concern of managers who wish to minimize their cost of equity capital at least as it pertains to bid-ask spreads.

Keywords: earnings predictability, bid-ask spreads, cost of capital

JEL Classification: M41, G12, G14, G31

Suggested Citation

Affleck-Graves, John Felix and Callahan, Carolyn M. and Chipalkatti, Niranjan, Earnings Predictability, Information Asymmetry, and Market Liquidity. Journal of Accouting Research, June 2002, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=308218

John Felix Affleck-Graves

University of Notre Dame - Department of Finance ( email )

P.O. Box 399
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Notre Dame, IN 46556-0399
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Carolyn M. Callahan (Contact Author)

University of Louisville - College of Business ( email )

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Louisville, KY 40292
United States
(502) 852-6443 (Phone)
(502) 852-7557 (Fax)

Niranjan Chipalkatti

Ohio Northern University ( email )

Ada, OH 45810
United States

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