Regulatory Reform: A Scorecard

26 Pages Posted: 12 Dec 2017

See all articles by Stephen G. Cecchetti

Stephen G. Cecchetti

Brandeis International Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Kermit Schoenholtz

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Date Written: November 2017


The financial crisis of 2007-09 revealed many deficiencies in the financial system. In response, authorities have implemented a wide range of regulatory reforms. We survey the reforms and offer our views on where there could be further improvements. While capital requirements and levels are far higher, they are not high enough. New liquidity requirements are useful, but need simplification. Shifting derivatives transactions to central counterparties has improved resilience, but also created indispensable financial market utilities that lack credible resolution and recovery regimes. And systemic (macroprudential) regulation lacks the metrics, policy tools, governance structure, and international cooperation needed to be effective.

Keywords: Capital requirements, Central clearing, financial regulation, liquidity requirements, macro-financial linkages, macroprudential policy, Prudential regulation, recovery and resolution planing

JEL Classification: E58, G01, G18, G28, G38

Suggested Citation

Cecchetti, Stephen G. and Schoenholtz, Kermit, Regulatory Reform: A Scorecard (November 2017). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12465. Available at SSRN:

Stephen G. Cecchetti (Contact Author)

Brandeis International Business School ( email )

415 South Street
Waltham, MA 02453
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
212-720-8629 (Phone)
212-720-2630 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

United Kingdom

Kermit Schoenholtz

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

Suite 9-160
New York, NY
United States

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