Corruption, Cooperation, and the Evolution of Prosocial Institutions

9 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2017  

Michael Muthukrishna

London School of Economics and Political Science

Date Written: December 4, 2017

Abstract

This article describes how corruption can and ought to be viewed as competing scales of cooperation. Viewing corruption through the lens of the cooperation literature gives us a mature theoretical and empirical framework from which to derive predictions and make sense of existing findings. This article was originally posted online at Evonomics and ProMarket, The blog of the Stigler Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business as "Bribery, Cooperation, and the Evolution of Prosocial Instituions". I'm publishing a pre-print here for easier citation and for eventual expansion.

Keywords: cooperation, corruption, bribery, nepotism, cronyism, large-scale cooperation, public goods game, bribery game

Suggested Citation

Muthukrishna, Michael, Corruption, Cooperation, and the Evolution of Prosocial Institutions (December 4, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3082315 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3082315

Michael Muthukrishna (Contact Author)

London School of Economics and Political Science ( email )

Houghton Street, Social Psychology
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
62
rank
318,582
Abstract Views
202
PlumX