Repeated Coordination with Private Learning

29 Pages Posted: 5 Dec 2017

See all articles by Pathikrit Basu

Pathikrit Basu

California Institute of Technology

Kalyan Chatterjee

The Pennsylvania State University

Tetsuya Hoshino

ITAM

Omer Tamuz

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Date Written: December 4, 2017

Abstract

We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true state from private signals, as well as the actions of others. They commonly learn the true state (Cripps et al., 2008), but do not coordinate in every equilibrium. We show that it is possible to construct equilibria in which players eventually coordinate on the correct action, for any discount factor. For high discount factors we show that in addition players can also achieve efficient payoffs.

Keywords: Repeated Games, Coordination, Learning

JEL Classification: C73

Suggested Citation

Basu, Pathikrit and Chatterjee, Kalyan and Hoshino, Tetsuya and Tamuz, Omer, Repeated Coordination with Private Learning (December 4, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3082589 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3082589

Pathikrit Basu

California Institute of Technology ( email )

1200 East California Blvd.
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://pathikritbasu.weebly.com

Kalyan Chatterjee

The Pennsylvania State University ( email )

Dept. of Economics
University Park, PA 16802
United States
814-865-6050 (Phone)
866-716-1527 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://kalyanchatterjee.weebly.com

Tetsuya Hoshino

ITAM ( email )

Camino a Santa Teresa No. 930
Col. Héroes de Padierna
Ciudad de México
Mexico

Omer Tamuz (Contact Author)

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

1200 East California Blvd.
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
44
Abstract Views
341
PlumX Metrics