Przymusowy wykup akcji w świetle stanowiska Trybunału Konstytucyjnego (Minority Squeeze-Out in the Light of the Constitutional Court Decision)

Code of Commercial Companies after 5 years, Festschrift of the Wroclaw University on the 5th Biannual Conference of the Commercial Law Institutes of Poland, Wrocław 2006, at p. 574-593

10 Pages Posted: 9 Dec 2017

See all articles by Arkadiusz Radwan

Arkadiusz Radwan

Allerhand Institute; Vytautas Magnus University - Faculty of Law; Kubas Kos Gałkowski

Date Written: 2006

Abstract

Polish Abstract: Artykuł stanowi krytyczne omówienie wyroku Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z dn. 21 czerwca 2005 r. (Sygn. akt P 25/02) dotyczącego konstytucyjności art. 418 KSH (squeeze-out). Trybunał wydał wyrok interpretacyjny, dopuszczający, jako zgodną z konstytucyjną ochroną własności oraz konstytucyjnym prawem do sprawiedliwego i jawnego rozpatrzenia sprawy przez sąd, taką wykładnię art. 418 KSH, zgodnie z którą w sporach uchwałowych sądy, na żądanie skarżącego akcjonariusza, powinny przeprowadzać kontrolę rzeczową (materialną) zasadności podjęcia uchwały o przymusowym wykupie akcjonariuszy mniejszościowych. Artykuł przedstawia ekonomiczne, systemowe i prawnoporównawcze argumenty przeciwko stanowisku przyjętemu przez TK.

English Abstract: Introduction of rules on minority squeeze-out into the Polish Joint-Stock Company law stirred up a discussion in the literature, focusing primarily on its compliance with the Polish Constitutional law and with the nature of a joint-stock company. The Polish Constitutional Court expressed its view on the former in a decision of June 21st, 2005, in which it imposed a specific interpretation of Art. 418 of the Polish Code of Commercial Companies and its relation with Art. 422, indicating that different perception of this provision shall be considered unconstitutional (the so-called interpretative judgment).

The essence of the case considered by the Court was to determine whether the minority squeeze-out may be subject to substantive review by the courts, to which the Court answered in the affirmative. The reasoning of Constitutional Court, notwithstanding its apparent approval of the compulsory buyout, de facto undermines the very defining feature of the squeeze-out, that is its dependence on formal requirements only. The essence of statutory squeeze-out is to immunize the majority action from the substantive control by the courts. Requiring the majority to provide reasons for minority buyout implies the lack of understanding of the pertinent institution. Compulsory buyout contributes to the improvement of the functioning of companies, the equity cost optimization and the effective allocation of capital. In addition, the investment character of participation of the minority in the company justifies granting the primacy of protection of capital (value) over protection of membership (ownership). The article explores these and some additional arguments against the reasoning as presented by the Constitutional Court.

Note: Downloadable document is in Polish

Keywords: minority freeze-out, squeeze-out right, compulsory buyout, share ownership, constitutional review of company law, Polish company law

Suggested Citation

Radwan, Arkadiusz, Przymusowy wykup akcji w świetle stanowiska Trybunału Konstytucyjnego (Minority Squeeze-Out in the Light of the Constitutional Court Decision) (2006). Code of Commercial Companies after 5 years, Festschrift of the Wroclaw University on the 5th Biannual Conference of the Commercial Law Institutes of Poland, Wrocław 2006, at p. 574-593. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3082794

Arkadiusz Radwan (Contact Author)

Allerhand Institute ( email )

Plac Sikorskiego 2/7
Kraków, 31-115
Poland

HOME PAGE: http://www.allerhand.pl

Vytautas Magnus University - Faculty of Law ( email )

Jonavos g. 66
Kaunas, LT-44191
Lithuania

Kubas Kos Gałkowski ( email )

Nowa Kamienica
ul. Rakowicka 7
Kraków, 31-511
Poland

HOME PAGE: http://www.kkg.pl

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