Privatisation and the Unusual Case of Belarusian Accession to the WTO

28 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2017

See all articles by Edward J. Balistreri

Edward J. Balistreri

Iowa State University

Zoryana Olekseyuk

Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) - German Development Institute (DIE)

David G. Tarr

International Trade Analysis

Date Written: December 2017

Abstract

The accession negotiations of Belarus to the WTO are unusual since, due to its obligations in the Eurasian Economic Union, WTO accession is not expected to impact its tariffs or formerly substantial trade‐distorting agricultural subsidies. Nonetheless, we estimate that WTO accession will increase welfare by 9.9% of consumption in Belarus. We show that inclusion of: (i) foreign direct investment; (ii) reduction in non‐discriminatory barriers against services providers; and (iii) our model with imperfect competition and endogenous productivity effects together produce estimated gains eleven times larger than a model of perfect competition with only cross‐border trade in services. Our analysis is enabled by our production of a data set on both discriminatory and non‐discriminatory barriers in services and their ad valorem equivalents. Based on a new data set on labour productivity by sector and type of ownership, in our central model, we estimate that privatisation will increase welfare by 35.8% of consumption. We find substantial variance in the estimated gains from privatisation depending on model assumptions, but all the estimates of the impacts of privatisation indicate substantial welfare gains.

Keywords: endogenous productivity, foreign direct investment, privatisation, services liberalisation, WTO accession

Suggested Citation

Balistreri, Edward J. and Olekseyuk, Zoryana and Tarr, David G., Privatisation and the Unusual Case of Belarusian Accession to the WTO (December 2017). The World Economy, Vol. 40, Issue 12, pp. 2564-2591, 2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3083243 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/twec.12520

Edward J. Balistreri (Contact Author)

Iowa State University ( email )

260 Heady Hall
Ames, IA 50011
United States
3032531674 (Phone)

Zoryana Olekseyuk

Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) - German Development Institute (DIE) ( email )

Tulpenfeld 4
Bonn, 53113
Germany

David G. Tarr

International Trade Analysis ( email )

7901 Hispanola Avenue
Apt. 1102
North Bay Village, FL 33141
United States
5712242796 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/davidgtarr/

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