Herding in Equity Crowdfunding

55 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2017 Last revised: 27 Nov 2018

See all articles by Thomas B. Astebro

Thomas B. Astebro

HEC Paris - Economics and Decision Sciences

Manuel Fernández Sierra

University of Essex; IZA

Stefano Lovo

HEC Paris - Finance Department

Nir Vulkan

University of Oxford - Said Business School

Date Written: December 7, 2017

Abstract

Do equity crowdfunding investors herd? We build a model where informed and uninformed investors arrive sequentially and choose whether and how much to invest. We test the model using data of investments on a leading European equity crowdfunding platform. We show theoretically and find empirically that the size and likelihood of a pledge is affected positively by the size of the most recent pledges, and negatively by the time elapsed since the most recent pledge. The empirical analysis is inconsistent with naive herding, independent investments, or exogenously correlated investments.

Keywords: Equity Crowdfunding, Herding

JEL Classification: D81, D83, G11, G14

Suggested Citation

Astebro, Thomas B. and Fernández Sierra, Manuel and Lovo, Stefano and Vulkan, Nir, Herding in Equity Crowdfunding (December 7, 2017). Paris December 2018 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - AFFI. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3084140 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3084140

Thomas B. Astebro (Contact Author)

HEC Paris - Economics and Decision Sciences ( email )

Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, 78351
France

HOME PAGE: http://www.hec.edu/Faculty-Research/Faculty-Directory/ASTEBRO-Thomas

Manuel Fernández Sierra

University of Essex ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

IZA ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Stefano Lovo

HEC Paris - Finance Department ( email )

1 rue de la Liberation
Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, 78351
France

Nir Vulkan

University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )

Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 01865 288929, or 288338 (Phone)
+44 01865 288805 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: https://vulkan.worc.ox.ac.uk/

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