The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the New Legislation

35 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 2017 Last revised: 20 Feb 2018

David Kamin

New York University School of Law

David Gamage

Indiana University Maurer School of Law

Ari D. Glogower

Ohio State University (OSU) - Michael E. Moritz College of Law

Rebecca M. Kysar

Brooklyn Law School; Fordham University School of Law

Darien Shanske

University of California, Davis - School of Law

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

University of Michigan Law School

Lily L. Batchelder

New York University School of Law

J. Clifton Fleming

Brigham Young University - J. Reuben Clark Law School

Daniel Jacob Hemel

University of Chicago - Law School

Mitchell Kane

New York University (NYU)

David S. Miller

Proskauer Rose LLP

Daniel Shaviro

New York University School of Law

Manoj Viswanathan

University of California Hastings College of the Law

Date Written: December 7, 2017

Abstract

This report describes various tax games, roadblocks, and glitches in the tax legislation currently before Congress, titled the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). The complex rules proposed in the House and Senate bills will allow new tax games and planning opportunities for well-advised taxpayers, which will result in unanticipated consequences and costs. These costs may not currently be fully reflected in official estimates already showing the bills adding over $1 trillion to the deficit in the coming decade. Other proposed changes will encounter legal roadblocks that will jeopardize critical elements of the legislation. Finally, in other cases, technical glitches in the legislation may improperly and haphazardly penalize or benefit individual and corporate taxpayers. This report highlights particular areas of concern that have been identified by a number of leading tax academics, practitioners, and analysts. An updated report, reflecting analysis of the conference bill released on December 15th, has been posted here: http://ssrn.com/abstract=3089423.

Keywords: Tax, Legislation, Tax Planning, Reform, Loopholes, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA)

JEL Classification: K34

Suggested Citation

Kamin, David and Gamage, David and Glogower, Ari D. and Kysar, Rebecca M. and Shanske, Darien and Avi-Yonah, Reuven S. and Batchelder, Lily L. and Fleming, J. Clifton and Hemel, Daniel Jacob and Kane, Mitchell and Miller, David S. and Shaviro, Daniel and Viswanathan, Manoj, The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the New Legislation (December 7, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3084187 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3084187

David Kamin (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States

David Gamage

Indiana University Maurer School of Law ( email )

211 S. Indiana Avenue
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.indiana.edu/about/people/bio.php?name=gamage-david

Ari D. Glogower

Ohio State University (OSU) - Michael E. Moritz College of Law ( email )

55 West 12th Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210
United States

Rebecca M. Kysar

Brooklyn Law School ( email )

250 Joralemon Street
Brooklyn, NY 11201
United States

Fordham University School of Law ( email )

113 West 60th Street
New York, NY 10023
United States

Darien Shanske

University of California, Davis - School of Law ( email )

400 Mrak Hall Dr
Davis, CA CA 95616-5201

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

University of Michigan Law School ( email )

625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States
734-647-4033 (Phone)

Lily L. Batchelder

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-992-8156 (Phone)

J. Clifton Fleming

Brigham Young University - J. Reuben Clark Law School ( email )

430 JRCB
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
United States

Daniel Jacob Hemel

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Mitchell Kane

New York University (NYU) ( email )

Bobst Library, E-resource Acquisitions
20 Cooper Square 3rd Floor
New York, NY 10003-711
United States

David S. Miller

Proskauer Rose LLP ( email )

Eleven Times Square
New York, NY 10036-8299
United States

Daniel Shaviro

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
Room 314-B
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6187 (Phone)
212-995-4341 (Fax)

Manoj Viswanathan

University of California Hastings College of the Law ( email )

200 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
United States

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