References (39)



Limited Autocracy

Jonathan Klick

University of Pennsylvania Law School; Erasmus School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

January 2002

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 02-15

All politicians, regardless of the nominal form of government within which they operate, face the trade-off between current period gains and tenure extension. That is, rulers can exploit their power for personal gain, but they risk being removed from their positions of power, either through a popular vote or a coup or revolution. If they temper their exploitation to remain in power, they sacrifice some of their current personal gain. Essentially all politicians are limited autocrats, where the limitations imposed on them differ according to the institutional structure under which they rule. This paper presents a formal model of this trade off in the Mancur Olson stationary bandit framework, where tenure length is explicitly endogenized in the politician's maximization problem.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: Economics, Public Choice, Constitutional Political Economy, Autocracy, Dictatorship, Origin of the State

JEL Classification: H0, K0

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Date posted: May 8, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Klick, Jonathan, Limited Autocracy (January 2002). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 02-15. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=308584 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.308584

Contact Information

Jonathan Klick (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
2157463455 (Phone)
Erasmus School of Law ( email )
3000 DR Rotterdam
PERC - Property and Environment Research Center
2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

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