Egalitarianism with a Dash of Fair Efficiency

15 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2017

Date Written: December 13, 2017

Abstract

We study the construction of Paretian egalitarian social ordering functions in a distribution model with multiple goods and heterogeneous preferences. Given the impossibility to combine equality of resources with efficiency (Fleurbaey and Trannoy, 2003), we define weaker axioms of equality and efficiency relying on the mean bundle in the allocation. We identify a leximin social ordering functions that satisfy these weaker axioms by relying on welfare measures representing the fraction of the mean bundle that would leave an agent indifferent with her bundle.

Keywords: Fairness, Social orderings, Equality, Efficiency

JEL Classification: D63, D71

Suggested Citation

Van der Linden, Martin, Egalitarianism with a Dash of Fair Efficiency (December 13, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3087462 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3087462

Martin Van der Linden (Contact Author)

Emory University ( email )

201 Dowman Drive
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States

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