Institutional Holdings and Payout Policy

44 Pages Posted: 6 May 2002

See all articles by Yaniv Grinstein

Yaniv Grinstein

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management; Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Roni Michaely

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI); Swiss Finance Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2002

Abstract

We examine the relation between institutional holdings and payout policy in U.S. public firms. We find that payout policy affects institutional holdings. On average, institutions decrease their holdings after an increase in dividends and increase their holdings after an increase in repurchases. We do not find evidence that a change in institutional holdings causes firms to change their dividend or repurchase policy. Our results do not support models which predict that dividends attract institutional clientele, and models which predict that institutions cause firms to increase payout.

Suggested Citation

Grinstein, Yaniv and Michaely, Roni, Institutional Holdings and Payout Policy (April 2002). AFA 2003 Washington, DC Meetings. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=308870 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.308870

Yaniv Grinstein (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )

Sage Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
607-255-8686 (Phone)
607-254-4590 (Fax)

Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah ( email )

P.O. Box 167
Herzliya, 46150
Israel

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

Roni Michaely

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI) ( email )

40 Boulevard du Pont d'Arve
Geneva 4, 1211
Switzerland

Swiss Finance Institute

c/o University of Geneva
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
CH-1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland

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