Crowdfunding Public Goods: An Experiment

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2017-119/VIII

44 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2017

See all articles by Erik Ansink

Erik Ansink

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics

Mark J. Koetse

Free University of Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics

Jetske Bouma

PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (The Hague)

Dominic Hauck

VU University Amsterdam

Daan van Soest

Tilburg University - CentER & Department of Economics

Date Written: December 14, 2017

Abstract

We assess the impact of different crowdfunding designs on the success of crowdfunded public goods using a lab-in-the-field experiment. Our design treatments aim to increase the efficiency of crowdfunding campaigns by raising aggregate contributions and decreasing possible coordination problems that may occur when potential donors are faced with a multitude of projects seeking contributions. Amongst others, we explore the potential of seed money and the impact of the attraction effect. Using a four-day time window we implement our crowdfunding experiment using a web-based user interface with multiple threshold public goods, similar in style to conventional crowdfunding websites. We find that such alternative crowdfunding designs affect efficiency via improving coordination, and not so much via affecting total contributions. These results are confirmed in a follow-up framed field experiment with actual nature conservation projects.

Keywords: crowdfunding, lab-in-the-field experiment, threshold public goods, charitable giving, nature conservation

JEL Classification: C93, H41, L31, Q57

Suggested Citation

Ansink, Erik and Koetse, Mark J. and Bouma, Jetske and Hauck, Dominic and van Soest, Daan P., Crowdfunding Public Goods: An Experiment (December 14, 2017). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2017-119/VIII. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3088763 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3088763

Erik Ansink (Contact Author)

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

Mark J. Koetse

Free University of Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, 1081 HV
Netherlands
+31(0)20 598 6168 (Phone)
+31(0)20 598 6004 (Fax)

Jetske Bouma

PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (The Hague) ( email )

Oranjebuitensingel 6
The Hague, 2511 VE
Netherlands

Dominic Hauck

VU University Amsterdam ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, ND North Holland 1081 HV
Netherlands

Daan P. Van Soest

Tilburg University - CentER & Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2072 (Phone)

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