Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange

14 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2002  

Stergios Skaperdas

University of California - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Constantinos Syropoulos

LeBow College of Business, Drexel University

Abstract

We examine the effect of insecure property and its accompanying enforcement costs on the efficiency of exchange. Because of the large enforcement costs that may be induced by the expectation of exchange, limited settlement without exchange may be ex ante superior for an adversary or even Pareto dominant. We therefore show how the removal of restrictions on exchange and the development of secure property are related.

Suggested Citation

Skaperdas, Stergios and Syropoulos, Constantinos, Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange. The Economic Journal, Vol. 112, pp. 133-146, 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=308902

Stergios Skaperdas (Contact Author)

University of California - Department of Economics ( email )

3123 Social Science Plaza A
Irvine, CA 92697-5100
United States
714-824-4167 (Phone)
714-824-2182 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Constantinos Syropoulos

LeBow College of Business, Drexel University ( email )

3141 Chestnut St
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-895-2792 (Phone)
215-895-6975 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.lebow.drexel.edu/SyropoulosC/

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