The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax Legislation

83 Pages Posted: 28 Dec 2017 Last revised: 7 May 2019

See all articles by David Kamin

David Kamin

New York University School of Law

David Gamage

University of Missouri School of Law

Ari Glogower

Northwestern Pritzker School of Law

Rebecca M. Kysar

Fordham University School of Law

Darien Shanske

University of California, Davis - School of Law

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

University of Michigan Law School

Lily L. Batchelder

New York University School of Law

J. Clifton Fleming

Brigham Young University - J. Reuben Clark Law School

Daniel J. Hemel

New York University School of Law

Mitchell Kane

New York University School of Law

David S. Miller

Proskauer Rose LLP

Daniel Shaviro

New York University School of Law

Manoj Viswanathan

UC Law, San Francisco

Date Written: December 18, 2017

Abstract

The 2017 tax legislation brought sweeping changes to the rules for taxing individuals and business, the deductibility of state and local taxes, and the international tax regime. The complex legislation was drafted and passed through a rushed and secretive process intended to limit public comment on one of the most consequential pieces of domestic policy enacted in recent history.

This Article is an effort to supply the analysis and deliberation that should have accompanied the bill’s consideration and passage and describes key problem areas in the new legislation. Many of the new changes fundamentally undermine the integrity of the tax code and allow well-advised taxpayers to game the new rules through strategic planning. These gaming opportunities are likely to worsen the bill’s distributional and budgetary costs beyond those expected in the official estimates. Other changes will encounter legal roadblocks, while drafting glitches could lead to uncertainty and haphazard increases or decreases in taxes. This Article also describes reform options for policymakers who will inevitably be tasked with enacting further changes to the tax law in order to undo the legislation’s harmful effects on the fiscal system.

Keywords: Tax, Legislation, Tax Planning, Reform, Loopholes, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA)

JEL Classification: K34

Suggested Citation

Kamin, David and Gamage, David and Glogower, Ari and Kysar, Rebecca M. and Shanske, Darien and Avi-Yonah, Reuven S. and Batchelder, Lily L. and Fleming, J. Clifton and Hemel, Daniel J. and Kane, Mitchell and Miller, David S. and Shaviro, Daniel and Viswanathan, Manoj, The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax Legislation (December 18, 2017). Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 103, 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3089423 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3089423

David Kamin (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

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David Gamage

University of Missouri School of Law ( email )

Missouri Avenue & Conley Avenue
Columbia, MO MO 65211
United States

HOME PAGE: http://law.missouri.edu/person/david-gamage/

Ari Glogower

Northwestern Pritzker School of Law ( email )

750 N. Lake Shore Drive
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

Rebecca M. Kysar

Fordham University School of Law ( email )

150 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States

Darien Shanske

University of California, Davis - School of Law ( email )

400 Mrak Hall Dr
Davis, CA CA 95616-5201

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

University of Michigan Law School ( email )

625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States
734-647-4033 (Phone)

Lily L. Batchelder

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-992-8156 (Phone)

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J. Clifton Fleming

Brigham Young University - J. Reuben Clark Law School ( email )

430 JRCB
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
United States

Daniel J. Hemel

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States

HOME PAGE: http://rb.gy/j5afjp

Mitchell Kane

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States

HOME PAGE: http://rb.gy/swqd86

David S. Miller

Proskauer Rose LLP ( email )

Eleven Times Square
New York, NY 10036-8299
United States

Daniel Shaviro

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
Room 314-B
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6187 (Phone)
212-995-4341 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://rb.gy/no08bj

Manoj Viswanathan

UC Law, San Francisco ( email )

200 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
United States

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