Last Place Aversion in Queues

40 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2017  

Ryan W. Buell

Harvard Business School

Date Written: December 19, 2017

Abstract

This paper investigates whether people exhibit last place aversion in queues and its implications for their experiences and behaviors in service environments. An observational analysis of customers queuing at a grocery store, and three online field experiments in which participants waited in virtual queues, revealed that waiting in last place diminishes wait satisfaction while increasing the probabilities of switching and abandoning queues. After controlling for other factors, people in last place were more than twice as likely to switch queues, which increased the duration of their wait and diminished their overall satisfaction. Moreover, people in last place were more than four times more likely to renege from queues, altogether giving up on the service for which they were queuing. The results indicate that this behavior is partially explained by the inability to make a downward social comparison; namely, when no one is behind a queuing individual, that person is less certain that continuing to wait is worthwhile. Furthermore, this paper provides evidence that queue transparency is an effective service design lever that managers can use to reduce the deleterious effects of last place aversion in queues. When people can’t see that they’re in last place, the behavioral effects of last place aversion are nullified, and when they can see that they’re not in last place, the tendency to renege is greatly diminished.

Keywords: Behavioral operations, queues, reference effects, last place aversion, transparency

Suggested Citation

Buell, Ryan W., Last Place Aversion in Queues (December 19, 2017). Harvard Business School Technology & Operations Mgt. Unit Working Paper No. 18-053. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3090591 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3090591

Ryan W. Buell (Contact Author)

Harvard Business School ( email )

Soldiers Field Road
Morgan Hall 429
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-496-6918 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.hbs.edu/rbuell

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