Dealers' Insurance, Market Structure, and Liquidity

73 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2017

See all articles by Francesca Carapella

Francesca Carapella

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Cyril Monnet

University of Bern

Date Written: 2017-12-15

Abstract

We develop a parsimonious model to study the equilibrium structure of financial markets and its efficiency properties. We find that regulations aimed at improving market outcomes can cause inefficiencies. The welfare benefit of such regulation stems from endogenously improving market access for some participants, thus boosting competition and lowering prices to the ultimate consumers. Higher competition, however, erodes profits from market activities. This has two effects: it disproportionately hurts more efficient market participants, who earn larger profits, and it reduces the incentives of all market participants to invest ex-ante in efficient technologies. The general equilibrium effect can therefore result in a welfare cost to society. Additionally, this economic mechanism can explain the resistance by some market participants to the introduction of specific regulation which could appear to be unambiguously beneficial.

Keywords: Insurance, Central counterparties, Dealers, Liquidity

JEL Classification: G11, G23, G28

Suggested Citation

Carapella, Francesca and Monnet, Cyril, Dealers' Insurance, Market Structure, and Liquidity (2017-12-15). FEDS Working Paper No. 2017-119, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3090948 or http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2017.119

Francesca Carapella (Contact Author)

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

Cyril Monnet

University of Bern ( email )

Gesellschaftsstrasse 49
Bern, BERN 3001
Switzerland

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