Matching Schemes and Public Goods: A Review

25 Pages Posted: 21 Dec 2017

See all articles by Raphael Epperson

Raphael Epperson

University of Mannheim

Christiane Reif

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research - Environmental and Resource Economics, Environmental Management Research

Date Written: 2017

Abstract

Matching schemes, where a party matches the contribution of others, reduce the effective price of a good and aim to foster its demand. We review the empirical literature on the effectiveness of these schemes in the context of public goods, especially in the field of charitable giving. As different measures of effectiveness are used, we classify results according to (i) the level of public good provision, (ii) the amount of individuals' contributions, (iii) the likelihood to give and (iv) the contribution conditional on contributing a positive amount. Generalizing results is challenging, since context specific factors matter. Predominantly, a match is found to create a significant increase in public good provision without crowding out individuals' contributions, while the effect on the likelihood of giving and contribution condition on contributing a positive amount is nonnegative. The discussion reveals several avenues for future research, as putting stronger emphasizes on long term effects, public good competition or heterogeneity in responses.

Keywords: literature review, matching schemes, charitable giving, public goods

JEL Classification: D01, D64, H41, L31

Suggested Citation

Epperson, Raphael and Reif, Christiane, Matching Schemes and Public Goods: A Review (2017). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 17-070, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3091603 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3091603

Raphael Epperson (Contact Author)

University of Mannheim ( email )

Universitaetsbibliothek Mannheim
Zeitschriftenabteilung
Mannheim, 68131
Germany

Christiane Reif

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research - Environmental and Resource Economics, Environmental Management Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim
Germany

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