Delegation and Administrative Lobbying in Rule-Making

19 Pages Posted: 28 Dec 2017

See all articles by Thomas Groll

Thomas Groll

Columbia University - School of International and Public Affairs; Institute for Corruption Studies

Sharyn O'Halloran

Columbia University - School of International & Public Affairs

Geraldine McAllister

Columbia University

Date Written: December 18, 2017

Abstract

We explore the determinants of market regulation with an analysis of the policy-making process in which the legislature delegates authority to an executive agency and special interests can lobby the executive agency. We discuss how the mere threat of administrative lobbying by the industry may be sufficient to induce the agency to set policies preferred by the industry. Our analysis also shows that policy conflict, the difference between the legislature’s preferred policy and the agency’s implemented policy, is increasing in the agency’s vulnerability to lobbying but decreasing in the interest group’s lobbying cost when the legislature prefers more extreme policies. Administrative lobbying either amplifies or mitigates the conflict between the legislature and the agency. Relatedly, our analysis shows that the “ally principle” does not hold and the legislature prefers an agency that is slightly more biased against the industry. The legislature delegates greater discretion to the agency when policy uncertainty is higher, when policy conflict between the legislature and the agency is a lower, and when administrative lobbying mitigates the policy conflict between legislature and agency.

Suggested Citation

Groll, Thomas and O'Halloran, Sharyn and McAllister, G, Delegation and Administrative Lobbying in Rule-Making (December 18, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3092398 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3092398

Thomas Groll

Columbia University - School of International and Public Affairs ( email )

420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States
2128510194 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.columbia.edu/~tg2451

Institute for Corruption Studies

Stevenson Hall 425
Normal, IL 61790-4200
United States

Sharyn O'Halloran (Contact Author)

Columbia University - School of International & Public Affairs ( email )

420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States
(212) 854-3242 (Phone)
(212) 222-0598 (Fax)

G McAllister

Columbia University ( email )

535 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

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