Coalitions and Networks in Industrial Organization

20 Pages Posted: 12 Nov 2002

See all articles by Francis Bloch

Francis Bloch

University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM); National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)

Abstract

This paper provides a selective survey of recent approaches to coalition and network formation in industrial organization, and offers a unified framework in which the different approaches can be compared. We focus on two extreme forms of cooperation-collusive agreements and cost-reducing alliances. We show that bilateral negotiations yield higher levels of cooperation than multilateral agreements, that the formation of a cartel depends on the sequentiality of the procedure of coalition formation, and that the size of alliances depends on the membership rule.

Suggested Citation

Bloch, Francis, Coalitions and Networks in Industrial Organization. The Manchester School, Vol. 70, No. 1, pp. 36-55, January 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=309301

Francis Bloch (Contact Author)

University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM) ( email )

Centre de la Vieille Charité
2, rue de la Charité
Marseille, 13002
France

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) ( email )

54, boulevard Raspail
Paris, 75006
France

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